Preserving things.
Things that people in power don’t want to admit exist. Those kinds of
things. In furtherance of the message in my June 4, 2025 post, keeping copies of the banned photos of the Enola Gay and the USNS Harvey Milk alive and available, I offer a pdf of the National Institute of Justice study which, in disavowal of current government belief and teachings, states that in their studies, right-wing terrorism is indeed a real thing, and leads the others in severity and concern. And lives lost. But you should read it yourself; make up your own mind.
If by chance, you’ve tried this link 
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-nij-research-tells-us-about-domestic-terrorism
to
read the National Institute of Justice study: 
WHAT NIJ RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT
DOMESTIC TERRORISM
and found instead the fabled 404 error or equal (because
the web page has been removed by the rw terrorists running the department of
justice today).
Here it is:
Notes: I have done formatting to change the two
column spread of the pdf document to single column and correct some anomalies
from the copying, but I checked the words against the copy I got from the
Wayback Machine, so there aren’t any inadvertent changes. Or advertent ones,
either.
Also, NewsCorpse.com has the
Wayback Machine link, too, not that I thought mine would be the only copy
available!
Before you go on, the Wayback Machine can also deliver your very
own copy
here:
  Here you go (finally):
WHAT NIJ RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT
DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
BY STEVEN CHERMAK, MATTHEW DEMICHELE, JEFF
GRUENEWALD, MICHAEL JENSEN, RAVEN LEWIS, AND BASIA E. LOPEZ 
NIJ-funded research
projects have led to a better understanding of the processes that result in
violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to violence, and
how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism. 
  
 
  Militant, nationalistic, white supremacist violent extremism has increased in
  the United States. In fact, the number of far-right attacks continues to
  outpace all other types of terrorism and domestic violent extremism. Since
  1990, far-right extremists have committed far more ideologically
  motivated 
homicides than far-left or radical Islamist extremists,
  including 227 events that took more than 520 lives.1 In this same
  period, far-left extremists committed 42 ideologically motivated attacks that
  took  78 lives.2 A recent threat assessment by the U.S.
  Department of Homeland Security concluded that domestic violent extremists are
  an acute threat and highlighted a probability that COVID-19 pandemic-
related
  stressors, long-standing ideological grievances related to immigration, and
  narratives surrounding electoral fraud will continue to serve as a
  justification for violent actions.3 
Over the past
  20 years, the body of research that examines terrorism and domestic violent
  extremism has grown exponentially. Studies have looked at the similarities and
  differences between radicalization to violent domestic ideologies and
  radicalization to foreign extremist ideologies. Research has found that
  radicalization processes and outcomes — and perhaps potential prevention and
  intervention points — vary by group structure and crime type. In addition,
  research has explored promising and effective approaches for how communities
  can respond to radicalization and prevent future attacks.4 
One
  of the more common conclusions of recent research on radicalization is that no
  single profile accurately captures the characteristics of the individuals who
  commit extremist and hate crimes. 
The National Institute of Justice
  (NIJ) has played a unique role in the evolving literature on terrorism and
  violent extremism. NIJ has promoted the development of comprehensive terrorism
  databases to help inform criminal justice responses to terrorism, address the
  risk of terrorism to potential targets, examine the links between terrorism
  and other crimes, and study the organizational, structural, and cultural
  dynamics of terrorism. In 2012, the U.S. Congress requested that NIJ build on
  these focal points by funding “research targeted toward developing a better
  understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon and advancing
  evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention.”5
  NIJ has since funded more than 50 research projects on domestic
  radicalization, which have led to a better understanding of the processes that
  result in violent action, factors that increase the risk of radicalizing to
  violence, and how best to prevent and respond to violent extremism. 
  
This article discusses the findings of several NIJ-supported domestic
  radicalization studies that cover a range of individual and network-centered
  risk and protective factors that affect radicalization processes, including
  military involvement and online environments. The article also explores
  factors that shape the longevity of radicalization processes and their
  variation by group structure and crime type, and examines factors that affect
  pathways away from domestic extremism. It concludes with a discussion of how
  these findings can inform terrorism prevention strategies, criminal justice
  policy, and community-based prevention programming. 
The
  Characteristics of U.S. Extremists and Individuals Who Commit Hate
  Crimes 
Over the past two decades, research that seeks to understand
  individual-level engagement in violent extremism has grown tremendously.
  However, as the research field has developed, a gap has emerged between the
  increasingly sophisticated arguments that scholars use to explain extremism
  and the availability of data to test, refine, and validate theories of
  radicalization. 
In 2012, NIJ funded the Empirical Assessment of
  Domestic Radicalization project to address the data gap in radicalization
  research.6 The project created the Profiles of Individual
  Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database, a cross-ideological
  repository of information on the characteristics of U.S. extremists. In 2017,
  NIJ supported a follow-on project7 that sought to replicate the
  PIRUS data for individuals in the United States who commit hate crimes. This
  project yielded the Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) dataset, the first
  data resource for researchers and practitioners interested in understanding
  the risk and protective factors associated with committing hate
  crimes. 
PIRUS and BIAS are designed to provide users with
  information on a wide range of factors that can play a role in a person’s
  radicalization to criminal activity.8 These risk and protective
  factors can be divided into four domains:9 
   
  ◦    The situational characteristics of the crimes, including
  whether the acts were premeditated or spontaneous, involved co-conspirators,
  or were committed while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. 
 
    ◦    The characteristics of the victims, including whether
  targets were “hard” (for example, military bases, secure facilities) or “soft”
  (for example, businesses, public areas, private civilians) and whether the
  individuals had prior relationships with their victims. 
 
    ◦    Factors that produce the social bonds that may protect
  against mobilization to violence, such as marriage, military service, work
  experience, and advanced education. 
    ◦   
  Factors that may act as radicalization mechanisms and risk factors for
  violence, such as previous criminal activity, membership in extremist or hate
  groups, substance use, and mental illness. 
The PIRUS and BIAS
  data have been used to generate insights on a range of important topics
  related to hate crime and extremism; however, there are three overarching
  findings common to both datasets: diversity in beliefs, diversity in
    behaviors, and diversity in characteristics. 
Diversity in
  Beliefs 
Although it is not uncommon for a particular ideology to
  dominate the public discourse around extremism, the PIRUS and BIAS data
  indicate that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes routinely
  come from across the ideological spectrum, including far-right, far-left,
  Islamist, or single-issue ideologies. These ideologies break down into
  particular movements, or sub-ideologies. For instance, in 2018, the PIRUS data
  identified extremists associated with several anti-government movements,
  Second Amendment militias, the sovereign citizen movement, white supremacy,
  ecoterrorism, anarchism, the antiabortion movement, the QAnon conspiracy
  theory, and others.10 The prevalence of particular movements can
  ebb and flow over time depending on political climate and law enforcement
  priorities, but at no point in recent U.S. history has one set of beliefs
  completely dominated extremism or hate crime activity.11
  Furthermore, the PIRUS and BIAS data reveal that U.S. extremists
  and individuals who commit hate crimes are often motivated by overlapping
  views. For instance, it is common for individuals from the anti-government
  militia movement to adopt views of white supremacy or for those from the
  extremist environmental movement to take part in anarchist violence. Nearly
  17% of the individuals in PIRUS were affiliated with more than one extremist
  group or sub-ideological movement, and nearly 15% of the individuals in BIAS
  selected the victims of their hate crimes because of multiple identity
  characteristics, such as race and sexual orientation.112 
Diversity
  in Behaviors 
Although radicalization to violence has been a primary
  topic in extremism and hate crime research, the PIRUS and BIAS data indicate
  that U.S. extremists and individuals who commit hate crimes often engage in a
  range of violent and nonviolent criminal activities. Indeed, 42% of PIRUS and
  nearly 30% of BIAS individual actors engaged exclusively in nonviolent crimes,
  such as property damage, financial schemes, and illegal demonstrations.13
  Moreover, the violent outcomes represented in the PIRUS and BIAS data vary in
  scope and type. For instance, approximately 15% of those in BIAS committed or
  planned to commit mass casualty crimes, while the remaining subjects targeted
  specific victims.14 Similarly, nearly 50% of those in BIAS did not
  premeditate their crimes but rather acted spontaneously after chance
  encounters with their victims.15 
Diversity in
  Characteristics 
One of the more common conclusions of recent
  research on radicalization is that no single profile accurately captures the
  characteristics of the individuals who commit extremist and hate crimes.16
  The PIRUS and BIAS data support this finding, revealing that background
  characteristics vary considerably depending on ideological affiliations. For
  instance, white supremacists in PIRUS tend to be older and less well-educated
  and are more likely to have criminal histories than those who were inspired by
  foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and
  Syria, or those associated with the extremist environmental or anarchist
  movements.17 Despite these differences, some risk and protective
  factors tend to separate violent from nonviolent individuals, regardless of
  ideology.18 In the PIRUS data, individuals with criminal records,
  documented or suspected mental illness, and membership in extremist cliques
  are more often classified as violent, while those who are married with stable
  employment backgrounds are more likely to engage in nonviolent crimes.19
  Similarly, in BIAS, violent individuals are more likely to co-offend with
  peers, have criminal histories that include acts of violence, and offend while
  under the influence of drugs or alcohol.20 
Military
  Experience and Domestic Violent Extremism 
According to current
  statistics, individuals with military backgrounds represent 11.5% of the total
  known extremists who have committed violent and nonviolent crimes in the
  United States since 1990.21 Although this percentage seems small,
  there has been a growing trend of (former) military members engaging in
  extremist offenses in recent years. An average of seven people with U.S.
  military backgrounds per year committed extremist crimes between 1990 and
  2010. That rate has risen to an average of 29 people per year over the past
  decade. Also worth noting is that more than half (52%) of extremists with
  military experience are identified as violent. 
Given the growth of
  violent domestic extremism among military personnel, the relationship between
  military service and radicalization has become a major concern. Prior
  NIJ-funded studies have identified military experience as a potential risk
  factor for attempted and actual terrorism.22 The likelihood of
  radicalization and radicalization to violence increases when individuals have
  already left military service.23 This research suggests that
  military service is not a social bond that inhibits extremist
  violence. 
NIJ studies have also shown that individuals with
  military experience may be susceptible to recruitment by domestic violent
  extremist groups due to their unique skills, which an extremist group may
  perceive as contributing to the success of a terrorist attack.24
  Also, transitioning from military to civilian life appears to be a pull factor
  for engaging in violent extremism.25 Indicators for potential
  involvement in extremism may include a lack of a sense of community, purpose,
  and belonging. If these indicators are identified early, community
  stakeholders — in partnership with military agencies — could have an
  opportunity to intervene. Although such knowledge is valuable, the role of
  military service in radicalization to violent extremism still requires
  study. 
Differences in Violent Extremist Characteristics Between
  Military Veterans and Civilians 
In 2019, NIJ funded researchers at
  the University of Southern California to investigate the link between military
  service and violent domestic extremism. They are also examining the
  differences between military veteran and civilian extremists in terms of their
  characteristics and social networks.26 Although this study is
  ongoing, preliminary findings have been drawn from a secondary analysis of the
  American Terrorism Study data, which contain information on people federally
  indicted for terrorism-related crimes by the U.S. government between 1980 and
  2002.27 With these data, the researchers compared the demographic
  and homegrown violent extremist characteristics among military veterans and
  civilians. The demographic characteristics considered were age, race, sex,
  marital status, and education level. The homegrown violent extremist
  characteristics consisted of the length of group membership, type of terrorist
  group, role in the group, mode of recruitment into the group, primary target,
  and the state of indictment. 
The research team observed significant
  differences between military veteran and civilian extremists across both
  demographic and homegrown violent extremist characteristics. First, they found
  that military veteran and civilian extremists differed with respect to age,
  sex, and marital status. Specifically, individuals with military service who
  engaged in homegrown violent extremism were more likely to be older, male, and
  in marital or cohabiting relationships than civilians who engaged in homegrown
  violent extremism. Second, analyses revealed that, compared to civilian
  extremists, military veteran extremists had greater affiliations with
  right-wing terrorist groups (versus left-wing, international, or other
  terrorist groups) and were more likely to hold leadership positions within
  these groups and either initiate a terrorist group or unite groups together.
  Finally, other than government/federal officials or buildings, which were the
  primary targets across all groups, the primary targets of veterans were
  diverse social groups, such as those belonging to racial, ethnic, and
  religious minority groups. 
Implications of Transitioning Out of
  Military Service 
The University of Southern California researchers
  intend to supplement these results by interviewing members from the social
  networks of military veterans and civilians who committed homegrown violent
  extremism between 2003 and 2019. The findings produced thus far are important,
  especially because the association between military experience and terrorism
  is understudied. Ultimately, these results suggest that people who transition
  from active duty to veteran status experience a nuanced, complex, and
  potentially lifelong process. Veterans who encounter difficulties during this
  transition and desire — but lack — a sense of community, purpose, and
  belonging after leaving the military may be attracted to the pull of domestic
  extremist groups. In these groups, veterans can lead and collaborate with
  others of similar ideologies to accomplish a shared mission akin to what they
  did in the military. For example, the military veterans in this study largely
  endorsed right-wing values; thus, perhaps something about the narratives of
  right-wing extremist groups compensates for the void felt when leaving
  military service. With such insights in mind, researchers recommend forming
  partnerships among civilians, the military, and veteran communities to
  identify and prevent violent extremism among U.S. veterans. 
Longevity
  of Terrorist Plots in the United States 
A major question for
  researchers and counterterrorism officials is how to prevent the next act of
  terrorism or violent extremism from occurring. As such, much attention has
  been paid to disrupted plots and successful interdiction tactics that
  ultimately led to arrest and indictment. Less attention has been given to what
  those responsible for acts of terrorism and violent extremism do to
  successfully evade detection and arrest. In other words, the focus has not
  been on what terrorists and violent extremists are doing “right.” 
In
  2013, NIJ funded researchers at the University of Arkansas’ Terrorism Research
  Center to study the sequencing of precursor behaviors for individuals who have
  been federally indicted in the United States for charges related to terrorism
  and domestic violent extremism.28 Based on preliminary analyses,
  the researchers somewhat serendipitously observed lifespan differences between
  lone actors and those operating in small cells or more formalized groups.
  Consequently, it warranted a more comprehensive examination of the factors
  that increased the likelihood of terrorists and violent extremists evading
  arrest. NIJ funded the researchers to identify behaviors that improved the
  chances of plot longevity — or the ability for terrorists to commit acts of
  terrorism and evade capture by law enforcement — for individuals federally
  indicted on terrorism-related charges.29 
Data on the
  longevity of terrorism and violent extremism plots come from the American
  Terrorism Study, the longest-running project on terrorism and violent
  extremism in the United States. With NIJ funding that began in 2003,30
  the American Terrorism Study maintains the most comprehensive dataset on
  temporally linked precursor behaviors and outcomes of terrorism and violent
  extremism plots. To examine plot longevity, the Arkansas researchers31
  limited their analyses to 346 federally indicted individuals who were linked
  to the planning or completion of a terrorist attack in the United States from
  1980 to 2015. Longevity, or duration of their “terrorist lifespan,” is based
  on the date of a person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity and
  their “neutralizing” date (usually the date of arrest). 
One of the
  key findings from this research is a correlation between significant declines
  in the lifespan of individual terrorists and major changes to the U.S.
  Attorney General guidelines established to combat terrorism and violent
  extremism in the United States. For example, those who began in the mid- to
  late 1970s, following Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act, had a median
  longevity of 2,230 days. In contrast, the median lifespan of terrorists who
  began operating in the mid-1980s decreased to 1,067 days. Later, in the early
  2000s, it fell even further to 99 days, which reflects the FBI’s tighter focus
  on terrorism and violent extremism and guidelines granting law enforcement
  more discretion in the investigative techniques employed. 
The
  researchers also found that the lifespans of terrorists and violent extremists
  vary significantly depending on key attributes, such as ideology, sex, and
  educational attainment. For example, environmental and extreme left-wing
  violent extremists tend to sustain themselves for relatively long periods of
  time (5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively), while the longevity of extreme
  right-wing and radical Islamist terrorists is, on average, two years or
  less. 
Females federally indicted on charges related to terrorism
  and violent extremism also tend to have increased longevity compared to male
  terrorists and violent extremists, perhaps because of females’
  disproportionate representation in longer-lasting extreme left-wing and
  environmental movements, as well as increased representation in left-wing
  group leadership roles. Females involved in terrorism and extremism are
  usually more educated, which is also associated with extended longevity.
  Further, females who play support roles in terrorism and extremist groups — as
  is more often the case for right-wing extremists and radical Islamist
  terrorists — also appear to have longer lifespans. In contrast, males have
  been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior and actual
  incident participation than females. Both types of behavior are significantly
  more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and would be expected
  to shorten the longevity of both male and female terrorists and violent
  extremists. 
Finally, longevity also depends on a plot’s
  sophistication and the extent of the planning required to carry it out. Less
  sophisticated plans or executed plots, or those using simpler and less
  advanced weapons, are generally associated with longer lifespans for
  terrorists and violent extremists. More sophisticated plots may provide
  greater potential for missteps by terrorists and violent extremists and leads
  for law enforcement. Additionally, more sophisticated plots are associated
  with more meetings with accomplices and necessitate extra preparation.
  Importantly, both the number of meetings and preparatory activities have been
  found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist
  incidents, suggesting that early intervention or arrest are also linked to
  these two factors. 
How Domestic Terrorists Use the
  Internet 
Terrorists and terrorist groups use the internet to share
  propaganda and recruit new members. The internet provides a platform to
  strengthen their members’ commitment to the cause, encourage radicalized
  individuals to act, and coordinate legal and illegal activities. A recently
  published meta-analysis concluded, “Exposure to radical content online appears
  to have a larger relationship with radicalization than other media-related
  risk factors (for example, television usage, media exposure), and the impact
  of this relationship is most pronounced for the behavioral outcomes of
  radicalization.”32 
In 2014, NIJ funded a study to
  develop a deeper understanding of what domestic terrorists discuss on the
  internet.33 The study analyzed 18,120 posts from seven online web
  forums by and for individuals interested in the ideological far right. The
  research team read each post’s content and coded it for either quantitative or
  qualitative analyses depending on the project’s objective. 
The
  project provided several important insights into terrorist use of the
  internet. First, the web forums included discussions about a variety of
  beliefs, such as gun rights, conspiracy theories, hate-based sentiments, and
  anti-government beliefs; however, the intensity of ideological expression was
  generally weak. The nature of the online environments that far-right groups
  use likely facilitates the diffusion of ideological agendas. 
Second,
  the amount and type of involvement in these forums played a key role in
  radicalization. Posting behaviors changed over time. Users grew more
  ideological and radical as other users reinforced their ideas and connected
  their ideas to those from other forums. (It is important to note that the
  study focused on online expression and not conversion to offline
  violence.) 
Third, far-right extremists were primarily interested in
  general technology issues. Discussions focused on encryption tools and methods
  (such as Tor), internet service providers and social media platforms, and law
  enforcement actions to surveil illicit activities online. These far-right
  extremists appeared more interested in defensive actions than sophisticated
  schemes for radicalization or offensive actions such as criminal
  cyberattacks. 
The study used social network analyses to visualize
  user communications and network connections, focusing on individuals’
  responses to posts made within threads to highlight interconnected
  associations between actors. The social network analyses indicated that
  far-right forums have a low network density, which suggests a degree of
  information recycling between key actors. The redundant connections between
  actors may slow the spread of new information. As a result, such forums may
  inefficiently distribute new knowledge due to their relatively insular nature.
  They may also be generally difficult to disrupt, as the participants’ language
  and behaviors reinforce others and create an echo chamber. These networks are
  similar to others observed in computer hacker communities and data theft
  forums,34 which suggests that there may be consistencies in the
  nature of online dialogue regardless of the content. 
The study also
  indicated that extreme external events usually did not affect posting
  behaviors. However, there were significant differences associated with
  conspiratorial, anti-Islamic, and anti-immigrant posts after the Boston
  Marathon bombing. It may be that violence or major disruptive events inspired
  by jihadist ideologies draw great responses from far-right groups relative to
  their own actions. The same appears to be true for the 2012 presidential
  election; the study observed increases both in the number of posts in the
  month after the election and in overt signs of individual ties or associations
  to far-right movements through self-claim posts, movement-related signatures,
  and usernames. These findings are consistent with other recent work comparing
  online mobilization after the 2012 and 2016 presidential
  elections.35 
Entering and Exiting White Supremacy in the
  United States 
An NIJ-funded research team led by RTI International
  examined the complex social-psychological processes involved with entering,
  mobilizing, and exiting white supremacy in the United States.36 The
  researchers conducted in-depth life history interviews with 47 former members
  of white supremacist groups in 24 states and two provinces in
  Canada.37 
For this project, white supremacy referred to
  groups that reject essential democratic ideals, equality, and tolerance. A key
  organizing principle is that inherent differences between races and
  ethnicities position white and European ancestry above all others. Those
  interviewed were authoritarian, anti-liberal, or militant nationalists who had
  a general intolerance toward people of color. They had used violence to
  achieve their goals and supported a race war to eradicate the world of
  nonwhite people.38 
The study led to several key findings
  about entering and exiting white supremacy in the United States. 
Hate
  as Outcome 
The study found that most people do not join white
  supremacist groups because they are adherents of a particular ideology.
  Rather, a combination of background factors increases the likelihood that
  someone will be susceptible to recruitment messaging (for example,
  propaganda).39 Previous research has highlighted that hate or
  adherence to racist violence was an outcome of participation in white
  supremacist groups.40 The commitment to white supremacist groups
  lacked a preexisting sense of racial grievance or hatred that motivated an
  individual to join the racist movement.41 One former member
  reported having “no inkling of what [Nazism] really was other than what you
  saw on TV.”42 The NIJ-funded study found that people joined white
  supremacist groups because they were angry, lonely, and isolated, and they
  were looking for opportunities to express their rage.43 
Vulnerabilities
  as Precondition 
The former white supremacists had various personal,
  psychological, and social vulnerabilities that made them strive for what
  psychologists have framed as developing a new possible self.44 High
  levels of negative life experiences — including, but not limited to,
  maladjustment, abuse, and family instability — potentially make a person
  imagine a new, different, and more fulfilled self.45 They can
  imagine an empowered future self with friends and a purpose. Extremist
  recruiters prey on these desires. The former white supremacists indicated high
  levels of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse as children; strained
  personal relationships; and general difficulties throughout their lives. These
  struggles made white supremacy seem like an improvement to their sense of
  self, as the group came with a ready-made set of friends, social events, and
  camaraderie among individuals with similarly rough pasts. Besides these social
  benefits, white supremacist groups provided members with a deeper sense of
  belonging and explanation for their life troubles, rooted in a sense of racial
  pride and empowerment. 
Gradual, Nonlinear Exit 
Most
  white supremacists in this country do not remain members for life. Rather,
  group membership is often temporary (but not always short-lived), and many
  become disillusioned and burnt out over time. The study showed that the exit
  process is gradual, as the former white supremacists reported slowly becoming
  dissatisfied with the ideology, tactics, or politics of a group.46
  They described an identity that became filled with negative encounters with
  other members, even breeding distrust. White supremacy requires the
  development of a totalizing identity that results in isolating members from
  nonextremists. This marginalization fosters a sense of social stigma that
  makes white supremacy less attractive and further supports disengagement and
  deradicalization processes. 
This research reported that emotional
  dynamics create trajectories of development and decline in white supremacy and
  the role of disillusionment among the reasons why members exit the
  organization.47 
These analyses offer an
  explanation for how white supremacist organizations maintain solidarity even
  though many individuals stay in groups after losing their ideological
  commitment. They also demonstrate that exit from a group is a nonlinear
  process.48 Meanwhile, in other analyses, the study team reported
  that, even after an individual exits a group, their white supremacist identity
  lingers with a residual effect.49 That research likened hate to an
  addiction that creates an uncontrollable emotional, social, and cognitive hold
  over adherents, which has the ability to pull former members back into hate
  almost against their will.50 The former white supremacists shared
  experiences in which music, environments, and images created desire, longing,
  and curiosity about their old lifestyle within the organization. 
Opportunities 
The
  NIJ-funded study found several blind spots in terms of identification and
  awareness among criminal legal system practitioners and other responders. This
  resulted in several missed opportunities for intervention and practical
  solutions. Exhibit 1 details four areas in which the study findings can
  contribute to criminal justice policy and practice.51 
Policy
  Implications 
The results of the NIJ-funded studies discussed in
  this article have several implications for policy and practice. First, they
  illustrate that extremism is complex and that successfully countering it will
  require a unified response that bridges law enforcement, community partners,
  health officials, and concerned citizens. To facilitate a shared understanding
  of the extremist threat, stakeholders engaged in counterextremism efforts
  routinely use findings from these studies to provide training to concerned
  family and friends about potential radicalization warning signs and how best
  to respond. They also use the findings to educate law enforcement, corrections
  and probation officers, and mental health professionals on the complexity of
  radicalization so they can accurately gauge and respond to extremism in their
  communities. These types of training initiatives will remain critical to
  counterextremism efforts as the threat continues to evolve. 
Exhibit
  1. Missed Opportunities for Intervention and Practical Solutions 
Second,
  the studies highlight the importance of focusing criminal justice resources on
  domestic extremism. Although international terrorist organizations remain a
  threat, these studies show that domestic extremists continue to be responsible
  for most terrorist attacks in the United States. Historically, far fewer
  resources have been dedicated to the study of domestic extremism, leaving gaps
  in our understanding about terrorist trends, recruitment and retention
  processes, and online behaviors. Due in large part to NIJ’s commitment to
  funding research on domestic radicalization, considerable progress has
  recently been made in addressing these topics. But this work will need to
  continue if we hope to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat
  landscape. 
Finally, the studies highlight the need for
  communitywide partnerships that link government and nongovernment
  organizations in support of community-level prevention and intervention
  programs. Law enforcement and criminal justice resources for countering
  extremism are finite and scarce, making it imperative that we focus our
  research and support efforts on understanding what occurs before a crime takes
  place. As the studies reviewed in this article show, there is often an
  opportunity to intervene to help individuals exit extremism before they engage
  in criminal activity. Similarly, prevention efforts are needed in digital
  spaces where extremist narratives often flourish. Achieving these goals will
  require community members, policymakers, and practitioners to commit to
  supporting counterextremism efforts.
About the Authors 
Steven
  Chermak, Ph.D., is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan
  State University and studies domestic terrorism and cyber offending. Matthew
  DeMichele, Ph.D., is a senior research sociologist at RTI and has conducted
  research on correctional population trends, risk prediction,
  terrorism/extremism prevention, and program evaluation. Jeff Gruenewald,
  Ph.D., is a professor and director of the Terrorism Research Center at the
  University of Arkansas and studies domestic violent extremism and hate crime.
  Michael Jensen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the National Consortium for
  the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of
  Maryland, where he leads the team on extremism in the United States. Raven
  Lewis, M.A., is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey,
  and a former research assistant at the National Institute of Justice, where
  she supported research efforts focused on domestic radicalization and violent
  extremism. Basia E. Lopez, MPA, is a social science analyst at the National
  Institute of Justice, where she leads the firearm violence and mass shootings
  research portfolio and co-leads the violent extremism and domestic
  radicalization research portfolio. 
  
  This article discusses the
  following awards: 
“Exploring the Social Networks of Homegrown
  Violent Extremist (HVE) Military Veterans,” award number
  2019-ZA-CX-0002 
“Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A
  Crime Specific Analysis,” award number 2013-ZA-BX-001 
“Radicalization
  and the Longevity of American Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability,”
  award number 2015-ZA-BX-0001 
“Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist
  Incidents,” award number 2003-DT-CX-003 
“Empirical Assessment of
  Domestic Radicalization,” award number 2012-ZA-BX-0005 
“A Pathway
  Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders,” award number
  2017-VF-GX-0003 
“Research and Evaluation on Domestic
  Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA,” award
  number 2014-ZA-BX-0005 
“An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of
  Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize
  Individuals to Violence,” award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004 
Notes 
1. 
  Celinet Duran, “Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence: An Empirical
  Assessment of the Prevalence of Ideologically Motivated Homicides in the
  United States,” Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society 22 no. 2
  (2021): 33-49, https://ccjls.scholasticahq.com/
  article/26973-far-left-versus-far-right-fatal-violence-anempirical-assessment-of-the-prevalence-of-ideologicallymotivated-homicides-in-the-united-states;
  Joshua D. Freilich et al.,“Introducing the United States Extremist Crime
  Database (ECDB),” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 no. 2 (2014): 372-384,
  https://doi.org/10.1080/09 546553.2012.713229; and William Parkin, Joshua D.
  Freilich, and Steven Chermak, “Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike
  in 2017?” The Conversation, January 4, 2018, https://theconversation.com/
  did-far-right-extremist-violence-really-spike-in-2017-89067. 
2. 
  Duran, “Far-Left Versus Far-Right Fatal Violence”; Freilich et al.,
  “Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)”; and Parkin,
  Freilich, and Chermak, “Did Far-Right Extremist Violence Really Spike in
  2017?” 
3.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland
  Threat Assessment: October 2020, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland
  Security, 2020, https://www.
  dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_
  homeland-threat-assessment.pdf, 4. 
4.  Allison G. Smith, How
  Radicalization to Terrorism Occurs in the United States: What Research
  Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us, Washington, DC: U.S.
  Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 250171,
  https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/ xyckuh241/files/media/document/250171.pdf;
  and Michael Wolfowicz, Badi Hasisi, and David Weisburd, “What Are the Effects
  of Different Elements of Media on Radicalization Outcomes? A Systematic
  Review,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 18 no. 2 (2022),
  https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1244. 
5.  Aisha Javed Qureshi,
  “Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism: A National Issue Within
  a Global Context,” NIJ Journal 282, August 2020,
  https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/
  understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism. 
6. 
  National Institute of Justice funding award description, “Empirical Assessment
  of Domestic Radicalization,” at the University of Maryland, award number
  2012-ZA-BX-0005, https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2012-za-bx-0005. 
7. 
  National Institute of Justice funding award description, “A Pathway Approach
  to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders,” at the University of Maryland, College
  Park, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003, https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/
  awards/2017-vf-gx-0003. 
8.  The PIRUS and BIAS datasets are
  based on the same data collection methodologies and share similar goals. Both
  contain random samples of individuals who committed crimes in the United
  States that were motivated by their extremist ideologies or hate beliefs. The
  PIRUS dataset includes 2,225 individuals from 1948 to 2018, and BIAS is based
  on 966 cases from 1990 to 2018. Both datasets are collected entirely from
  public sources, including court records, online and print news, and public
  social media accounts. Both seek to capture individuals who promoted a range
  of extremist ideologies and hate beliefs. PIRUS, for instance, includes those
  whose crimes were associated with anti-government, white supremacist,
  environmental, anarchist, jihadist, and conspiracy theory movements.
  Similarly, BIAS includes individuals who selected victims based on their race,
  ethnicity, and nationality; sexual orientation and gender identity; religious
  affiliation; age; or disability. 
9.  Michael Jensen and Gary
  LaFree, “Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization
  (EADR),” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number
  2012-ZA-BX-0005, December 2016, NCJ 250481,
  https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/final-reportempirical-assessment-domestic-radicalization-eadr;
  and Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth A. Yates, and Sheehan E. Kane, “A Pathway
  Approach to the Study of Bias Crime Offenders,” Final report to the National
  Institute of Justice, award number 2017-VF-GX-0003, February 2021, NCJ 300114,
  https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/
  pathway-approach-study-bias-crime-offenders. 
10. Michael Jensen,
  Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in
  the United States (PIRUS),” Research Brief, College Park, MD: National
  Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], May
  2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/
  pubs/START_PIRUS_ResearchBrief_May2020.pdf. 
11. Jensen, Yates, and
  Kane, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States
  (PIRUS).” 
12. Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “A Pathway Approach to the
  Study of Bias Crime Offenders.” 
13. Jensen and LaFree, “Final
  Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR)”; and Jensen,
  Yates, and Kane, “A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime
  Offenders.” 
14. Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane,
  “Characteristics and Targets of Mass Casualty Hate Crime Offenders,” College
  Park, MD: START, 2020, https://www.
  start.umd.edu/publication/characteristics-and-targetsmass-casualty-hate-crime-offenders. 
15.
  Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “A Pathway Approach to the Study of Bias Crime
  Offenders.” 
16. John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots
  to Routes: Perspectives From Psychology on Radicalization Into Terrorism,” The
  ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 no. 1
  (2008): 80-94, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317539. 
17.
  Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
  States (PIRUS).” 
18. Gary LaFree, “Correlates of Violent Political
  Extremism in the United States,” Criminology 56 no. 2 (2018): 233-268,
  https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12169; Michael 
A. Jensen, Anita
  Atwell Seate, and Patrick A. James, “Radicalization to Violence: A Pathway
  Approach To Studying Extremism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32 no. 5
  (2020): 1067-1090, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09546553.2018.1442330; and Michael
  A. Jensen et al., “The Link Between Prior Criminal Record and Violent
  Political Extremism in the United States,” in Understanding Recruitment to
  Organized Crime and Terrorism, ed. David Weisburd et al. (New York: Springer,
  2020), 121-146, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36639-1_6. 
19.
  Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
  States (PIRUS).” 
20. Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan
  Kane, “Violent Hate Crime Offenders,” College Park, MD: START, 2020,
  https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/ violent-hate-crime-offenders. 
21.
  Unless otherwise noted, all data reported in this section originate from
  Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, Radicalization in the
  Ranks, College Park, MD: START, January 2022, https://start.umd.edu/
  publication/radicalization-ranks. In this project, extremists with military
  backgrounds consisted of active and nonactive personnel from all military
  branches and reserves, aside from the Space Force and Coast Guard Reserves.
  Individuals who were honorably discharged, dishonorably discharged, or
  otherwise violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice were excluded from the
  study. Also excluded were those discharged through court martial unless
  information about their criminal proceedings was publicly available. 
22.
  Allison G. Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization
  to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National
  Institute of Justice Tells Us, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
  National Institute of Justice, June 2018, NCJ 251789, https://www.
  ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251789.pdf. 
23. Jensen and LaFree, “Final
  Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR).” 
24.
  Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism
  in the United States. 
25. Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators
  Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States. 
26.
  National Institute of Justice funding award description, “Exploring the Social
  Networks of Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Military Veterans,” at the
  University of Southern California, award number 2019-ZA-CX-0002,
  https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2019-za-cx-0002. 
27. Unless
  otherwise noted, all data in this section come from Hazel R. Atuel and Carl A.
  Castro, “Exploring Homegrown Violent Extremism Among Military Veterans and
  Civilians,” The Military Psychologist 36 no. 3 (2021): 10-14, https://
  www.militarypsych.org/wp-content/uploads/TMP_vol363_Fall_2021-1.pdf. 
28.
  National Institute of Justice funding award description, “Sequencing
  Terrorists? Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis,” at the University
  of Arkansas, award number 2013-ZA-BX-0001, https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/
  awards/2013-za-bx-0001. 
29. National Institute of Justice funding
  award description, “Radicalization and the Longevity of American Terrorists:
  Factors Affecting Sustainability,” at the University of Arkansas, award number
  2015-ZA-BX-0001, https://nij.ojp. gov/funding/awards/2015-za-bx-0001. 
30.
  National Institute of Justice funding award description, “Pre-Incident
  Indicators of Terrorist Incidents,” at the Board of Trustees, University of
  Arkansas, award number 2003-DT-CX-0003, https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/
  awards/2003-dt-cx-0003. 
31. Unless otherwise noted, all data in
  this section come from Brent L. Smith et al., “The Longevity of American
  Terrorists: Factors Affecting Sustainability,” Final Summary Overview, award
  number 2015-ZA-BX-0001, January 2021, NCJ 256035,
  https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/256035.pdf. 
32.
  Wolfowicz, Hasisi, and Weisburd, “What Are the Effects of Different Elements
  of Media on Radicalization Outcomes?” 
33. Unless otherwise noted,
  all data in this section come from Thomas J. Holt, Steve Chermak, and Joshua
  D. Freilich, “An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social
  Media, and Technology To Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence,”
  Final Summary Overview, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0004, January 2021, NCJ
  256038, https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/
  assessment-extremist-groups-use-web-forums-socialmedia-and-technology. 
34.
  Thomas J. Holt and Adam M. Bossler, “Issues in the Prevention of Cybercrime,”
  in Cybercrime in Progress: Theory and Prevention of Technology-Enabled
  Offenses (New York: Routledge, 2016), 136-168. 
35. Ryan
  Scrivens et al., “Triggered by Defeat or Victory? Assessing the Impact of
  Presidential Election Results on Extreme Right-Wing Mobilization Online,”
  Deviant Behavior 42 no. 5 (2021): 630-645, https://doi.org/10.1080/016396
  25.2020.1807298. 
36. Matthew DeMichele, Peter Simi, and
  Kathleen Blee, “Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent
  Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA,” Final report to the National
  Institute of Justice, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0005, January 2021, NCJ 256037,
  https:// www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/256037.pdf. 
37. The
  project included three human rights groups (Anti-Defamation League, Simon
  Wiesenthal Center, and Southern Poverty Law Center) and Life After Hate, an
  organization that assists white supremacists in exiting the movement. The
  project partners helped develop a semi-structured interview protocol and
  provided contact information for initial interviewees. The study used a
  snowballing technique from these initial interviewees to identify former white
  supremacists who were in the public sphere to determine if they were
  interested in being interviewed. The interviews were conducted in places where
  the individuals would be comfortable, including hotel rooms, homes, places of
  work, coffee shops, restaurants, and parks. The interviews were in-depth
  accounts (lasting 6-8 hours each) of individuals’ backgrounds (for example,
  how they grew up), entry into white supremacy (for example, how they learned
  about the movement), mobilization (for example, rank and use of violence), and
  exit process (for example, initial doubts and barriers to exit). The
  completion of the project was a collaboration with equal contributions from
  Kathleen Blee, Matthew DeMichele, and Pete Simi and support from Mehr Latif
  and Steven Windisch. 
38. Steven Windisch et al., “Understanding the
  Micro-Situational Dynamics of White Supremacist Violence in the United
  States,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12 no. 6 (2018): 23-37,
  https://www.jstor.org/stable/26544641. 
39. DeMichele, Simi, and
  Blee, “Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent
  Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA.” 
40. Kathleen M. Blee et
  al., “How Racial Violence Is Provoked and Channeled,” Socio 9 (2017): 257-276,
  https://doi. org/10.4000/socio.3054. 
41. Blee et al., “How Racial
  Violence Is Provoked and Channeled.” 
42. Blee et al., “How Racial
  Violence Is Provoked and Channeled,” 265. 
43. DeMichele, Simi, and
  Blee, “Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent
  Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA.” 
44. Hazel Markus and
  Paula Nurius, “Possible Selves,” American Psychologist 41 no. 9 (1986):
  954-969, https://doi. org/10.1037/0003-066X.41.9.954. 
45. Unless
  otherwise noted, all data in the remainder of this paragraph come from
  DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization
  to Violent Extremism: Research To Support Exit USA.” 
46. All
  data in this paragraph come from DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “Research and
  Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To
  Support Exit USA.” 
47. Mehr Latif et al., “How Emotional
  Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups,” Humanity &
  Society 42 no. 4 (2018): 480-501, https://doi.
  org/10.1177/0160597618802552. 
48. Latif et al., “How Emotional
  Dynamics Maintain and Destroy White Supremacist Groups.” 
49. Pete
  Simi et al., “Addicted to Hate: Identity Residual Among Former White
  Supremacists,” American Sociological Review 82 no. 6 (2017): 1167-1187,
  https://doi. org/10.1177/0003122417728719. 
50. Simi et al.,
  “Addicted to Hate.” 
51. DeMichele, Simi, and Blee, “Research and
  Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research To
  Support Exit USA.” 
Image source: Sergey
  Nivens/Shutterstock. 
NCJ 306123 
Cite this article as:
  Steven Chermak et al., “What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism,”
  NIJ Journal 285, June 2024, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/
  what-nij-research-tells-us-about-domestic-terrorism.  
 
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